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AbstrAct: The chora has proven to be an obscure concept in contemporary philosophy. Cornelius 
Castoriadis seemed to retreat from the edge of its significance within his work, a significance that 
is capable of opening up another turn in the labyrinth of his thought. A clear interrogation into 
the presence of the chora in his thought has, still, yet to be elucidated. This paper proceeds 
with a notion of the chora defined for the purpose of highlighting its relevance for Castoriadis’ 
thought, taking up his schema trans-regional ontology and imaginary creation, which lean on 
the anticipation of a self-altering otherness. Locating the chora in Castoriadis’ trans-regional 
architectonics of being.
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… the other path, the tradition of Heralitus, Democritus, and the 
Sophists, has more or less been set aside throughout the history of 
philosophy. But Plato, like Aristotle, nevertheless retained something 
of this Greek trace. In their ontology, there is an irreducible portion 
of matter, that is to say, an ultimately unknowable portion. 
Castoriadis, On Plato’s Statesman, 145
Ontology is also, necessarily, cosmology. 
Castoriadis, “Done and to be Done”, Castoriadis Reader, 362
To begin with a notion of the chora is to begin with a highly ambiguous space. It concerns 
creation at an originary level; dealing with the extension of culture as the elaboration 
of nature. The notion of chora helps us to appreciate how this relation intimately reflects 
ontological creation, as a space through which meaning can be formed and instituted 
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in a way that we are able to appreciate the disclosure of being from the natural level 
to the social dimension. The chora is a space where the sensible and the intelligible are 
possible, a space elucidating the limit and transformation of knowledge; including the 
limits of our knowledge of the natural level. As John Sallis has pointed out, “a discourse 
of nature required that one first turn away, that one begin in the opposite direction, 
in accord with nomos rather than physis”1. As Cornelius Castoriadis would also argue, 
culture does emerge from nature, and in a very nuanced and reciprocal way, a way in 
which its beginning is, in fact, by definition, unknowable. The notion of chora, in so far 
as it concerns this very relation, involves this beginning as an essentially unknowable 
portion, and therefore to evoke a notion of the chora, to give it a name and describe it, 
necessarily evokes a bastard discourse—in so far as any description of the chora gives 
form to what is essentially formless. It is for this reason, as Sallis points out, that “it 
is of utmost importance… to prevent chora from settling into a determinate, stable 
meaning”2. This is not to say that thinking of the chora is produced through, what might 
be called a negative chorology, because it holds no attributes from that which it is not, 
an action which in itself gives a bastard discourse. To put it in simple and narrow terms, 
thinking of the chora is thinking of a space to think creation. Furthermore, this includes 
creation in the physical or imaginary dimensions, and more particularly a thinking of 
the spaces in-between. This is precisely why there have been tumultuous debates on the 
very question of the form and role of the chora in philosophical interrogation3. It is due 
to this innate evasiveness of chora that I am approaching this work as somewhat of an 
aporetic experiment. For scholarly interest in Castoriadis’ work this is still an aspect of 
his thought that has yet to be elucidated as such. Even he himself seemed to retreat from 
the edge of its significance within his work, a significance that is capable of opening up 
another turn in the labyrinth of his thought. 
The notion of chora owes its creation to earlier cosmological articulations of space in 
ancient Greek society—particularly as a common theme in pre-Socratic philosophy—
and was given elaboration as the central concept for explaining creation in Plato’s 
cosmological dialogue, the Timaeus. In this text the notion is attributed with the function 
of world ordering, giving form to chaos. In essence, this attribute refers to an instituting 
function, that creates, at the same time, a proper world and society as such—the parallel 
with Castoriadis’ primary concern of the institution of society is obvious, particularly 
his emphasis on the role of the social instituting imaginary4. For Castoriadis, “society 
is creation, and creation of itself: self-creation. It is the emergence of a new ontological 
     1. Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Pato’s Timaeus, 46
     2. Sallis, Ibid, 21
     3. Such as Derrida’s semantic concern of using a definitive article when referring to chora (i.e. the chora), 
arguing that it is not possible, therefore incorrect, to use a definitive article when there is no meaning upon 
which to refer. Rather, Derrida refers to chora (or, khôra, to be absolutely precise) as a proper name, in an 
attempt to specify the relation between the signifier and its referent. 
     4. See: Castoriadis, “The Imaginary Institution of Society” and “Radical Imagination and the Social 
Instituting Imaginary” in the Castoriadis Reader.
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form—eidos—and of a new mode and level of being” 5, this new region of being—
the social-historical; society—reflects the form given to chaos, the creation of social 
imaginary significations, creation of its own space responding to the task of world 
ordering meaning. For Plato the notion of chora is a response to the question: ‘what 
nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being?’ through which he replies that it is 
“the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all generation”6. In the recent philosophical 
context the chora has been treated disparately and in differing guises. The maternal 
overtones of its use by Plato have been identified by thinkers such as Julia Kristeva, 
Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz7 to investigate early formulations of 
sexual difference and the figuring of the feminine in symbolic and structural order. 
Jacques Derrida8 interprets chora as the empty space dealing with the place of the 
sensible and the intelligible, remaining absolutely adamant of its role as a notion of non-
determination, he analyses its place in thought and discourse while exploring whether 
there is principle of rhetoric inventiveness within the notion. John Sallis interprets the 
chora similarly, in that “the chora neither constitutes a determination, as in the case of the 
intelligible eide, nor can it be determined by an intelligible determination, as can sensible 
things”9, rather, he claims that the chora implodes the dyadic structure of the intelligible 
and the sensible10, problematising the subject/object distinction long held within the 
traditions of inherited metaphysics. However, Sallis differs slightly from Derrida’s 
interpretation, arguing for the retention of the article (the; ‘the chora’) as an index of a 
certain differentiation that still needs to be marked between the word and that to which 
the word is addressed, leaving open the discourse in which the word is operative (a 
discourse Sallis has named ‘chorology’). what interests me most, however, is how the 
chora has had a subterrestrial presence in many philosophical systems, albeit in different 
guises, as, I will show, is the case with Castoriadis’ thought. Take, for example, Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of lichtung11, as the clearing, unconcealment or disclosure of being; 
Nishida Kitarô’s conception of (muno) basho12, describing being as that which emerges 
from the space of nothingness; Alfred North whitehead’s development of the concept 
of extensive continuum13, through which he thinks creativity; or Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
framing of the visible and the invisible14, toward developing a generative understanding 
of otherness. All of these aspects possess a veiled interpretation of the chora. This veil 
seems to correspond with the point where a thinker must address creation within their 
systematic thinking, and as such there are varied expressions are formed. I will proceed, 
     5. Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, Castoriadis Reader, 332
     6. Plato, Timaeus, 213
     7. See: Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language; Irigaray, ‘Plato’s Hysteria’, Speculum of the Other woman; 
Butler, Bodies that Matter; Grosz, ‘women, Chora, Dwelling’, Space, Time, Perversion.
     8. Derrida, ‘Khora’, On the Name.
     9. Sallis, ‘An Interview with John Sallis: Double Truths’, Man and World, 113.
     10. Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Pato’s Timaeus, 46.
     11. Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the task of Thinking’, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings.
     12. Kitarô, Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarô.
     13. whitehead, Process and Reality.
     14. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible.
COSMOS AND HISTORY120
then, with a notion of the chora reflecting the trans-regional architecture of being and 
imaginary creation in Castoriadis’ thought, in a way that I believe to be of his expression 
of this limit.
CHORA AND PHYSIS
To lean on Thomas Rickert’s interpretation, the chora has “no real qualities itself; its odd 
passivity marks it as fundamentally indeterminate”15. As Rickert further elaborates, “the 
implication is that while a beginning requires a place, the generative or choric aspects 
of that place remain indeterminate, or… give nothing to what emerges”16. The chora, by 
virtue of its bastard character, can only be hypothesised through a speculum of apparent 
marks or traces. The notion is definitively generative and intuitively recognised through 
the vitality of emergent and transformative meaning. To radicalise the concept from 
its Platonic roots, its function as a metaphor does not imply a giving (that is; the hand 
of the demiurge) but a natural emergence of otherness as a condition of self-creation. 
while Castoriadis remained explicitly unengaged with the chora he did refer to its 
formulation by Plato, in the Timaeus, as the beginnings of a deterministic time, reduced 
to the production of difference in space, which was firmly instituted in western inherited 
thought and formed a large part of his critique of the inherited tradition. His stance on 
the chora, however, did seem to soften in the early nineties, hinting—in his seminars on 
Plato’s Statesman—at the usefulness of the metaphor in recognising the fact that there is 
“a huge portion of indeterminateness in what is”17. Regardless, at least in his published 
work, he still kept a wide berth from addressing this notion in any concentrated detail 
with respect to his own philosophy.
An early formulation whereby the chora becomes relevant to Castoriadis’ thought is 
found in his notion of the first natural stratum as an ontologically distinct mode of being 
from the more porous regions of society and the socialised subject. As Suzi Adams points 
out, he introduces the notion of étayage derived from the Freudian sense of anlehnung, a 
‘leaning on’ the first natural stratum, which for him is “an attempt to come to grips with the 
modality of the social-historical in its elaboration of partial aspects of the first natural 
stratum in a selective and non-determined way”18. For Castoriadis, these two regions 
of being emerge in a dynamic relation that was developed into a philosophy of being 
and creation that elaborated a circular motif of nomos and physis19. The trajectory of his 
philosophical thought can thus be seen to develop this relation, of étayage, toward a more 
creative physis. The chora, in this sense, is involved in the operation, the activity, or the 
doing, of creative physis involved in the passage of nature and culture. In trying to think of 
the chora in this way we approach the height of its ambiguity, for it can only be known at 
     15. Rickert, ‘Toward the Chora: Kristeva, Derrida, and Ulmer on Emplaced Invention’, Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 56.
     16. Rickert, Ibid, 56.
     17. Castoriadis, On Plato’s Statesman, 145.
     18. Adams, Castoriadis’ Ontology: Being and Creation, 54.
     19. For a reading of Castoriadis’ work along these lines see, Adams, Castoriadis’s Ontology: Being and Creation. 
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the limits of the unknown, revealing its essence as the creative emergence of sense from 
non-sense. In defining the nature of what is essentially outside the limits of knowability, 
or, in trying to comprehend creation as a reflection of Beginning, the act doubles over 
itself, the attempt realises its constitution from its constituent level and can go no further. 
This means that the present evocation of such a notion can only be understood through 
its utilisation to constitute something to be known. Therefore the essence of the chora 
is bestowed through the nature of what emerges in evoking it. we can only know the 
chora as a forming and generative capacity pertaining to a cosmological, or ‘natural’, 
import, which is responsible for constituting the mode of being of the social-historical 
domain but not necessarily the constitution of it. It undertakes, what Julia Kristeva 
names, an “objective ordering”, whose limits are indissociable from that which arises 
through the social-historical region. Maria Margaroni describes Kristeva’s account as 
the “transverbal (moving through and across logos) and transhistorical (alongside, opposite 
to and in the margins of history)”20. The paradox involved in identifying the activity of 
‘objective ordering’ that occurs outside the limits of representation is that we can only 
encounter and comprehend it within the symbolic realm—as Sallis has pointed out, 
one must work in accord with nomos to see physis. In regards to the impossibility of ever 
conceiving of the beginning, as reflected in the architectonics of the Timaeus doubling 
over to ‘begin again’, Castoriadis, too, develops this orientation within the architecture 
of his trans-regional ontology, perceiving the flux of physis in relation to nomos; a natural 
feedback echoing from the primal level of the first natural stratum through all regions 
of being. The differentiation of space and time is, therefore, critical for revealing the 
chora in Castoriadis’ thought. As will be further elaborated, this allows the conditions of, 
both, movement (as alloiõsis—pertaining to a qualitative change relating to sensation, 
which Castoriadis radicalises to further describe the alterations of physis) and permanent 
conflictuality to become essential for the trans-regionality of being. These conditions 
are reflected within and across the ontological regions through the schema of nomos 
and physis. In declaring space as not reducible to time Castoriadis inadvertently bursts 
the containing, receptacle, nature of the chora as receptacle, which serves to radicalise 
the Platonic conception from the omnipotence of the Demiurge toward undetermined 
cosmological creation—in turn, opening up his project of autonomy. In this respect, 
Castoriadis re-activates a trace leading back to the tradition of Heraclitus, Democritus 
and the Sophists21. By locating space as separable, yet, indissociable from time, 
Castoriadis opens the chora to the plurality and alterability of time. Chora, then, truly 
comes to encompass physis, lending a true vitality and indeterminateness to nomos. The 
nexus of subjective and social-historical meaning is therefore not fixed in one place or at 
one time and creation is unbounded from determinate logic.
     20. Margaroni, ‘The Lost Foundation: Kristeva’s Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy’, Hypatia, 84.
     21. Castoriadis, On Plato’s Statesman, 145.
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CHORA AND RADICAL IMAGINARY
In order to think of the chora in Castoriadis’ philosophy the psychic life of a person 
needs to be situated within the overall chorology of the social-historical domain. 
Castoriadis theorises the nexus between psyche and society—which is at the heart of 
the gap in-between nature and culture—through his notion of radical imagination, which 
he describes as the source of perceptual quale and of logical forms, that is, the source 
of the sensible and the intelligble, the (‘truly Heraclitean’) “flux of representations cum 
affects cum intentions”22 of the psyche; it is “what makes it possible for any being-for-itself 
(including humans) to create for itself an own [or proper] world (eine Eigenwelt) ‘within’ 
which it also posits itself ”23. The process of socialisation can, therefore, be envisaged 
as an incommensurable opening to the chora. The social-historical mode of being, as 
such, needs to be regarded as exceeding the limits of subjectivity. This is where the 
chora should play a decisive role in Castoriadis’ theory of society as its definitive feature 
is that it takes into account what is outside the limit of the eigenwelt as the propensity 
to an otherness that becomes subject to an alteration of the self. The eigenwelt, the qualia 
of our inner world, or self-world, can only be intelligible in contrast to the umwelt, the 
broader cosmic world, a world stratum within which the mythic structures of the social-
historical are a part. Both are rife with the tensions of chaos and objective ordering. 
The eigenwelt and the umwelt create their own space and time, thus being is indissociable 
from the creation of space or time. Suzi Adams has noted that, “unlike Heidegger, who 
sees only one temporality as authentic, Castoriadis sees a plurality of possible authentic 
times—be they cosmic or subjective. Yet the question of overarching time and being 
remains open”24. In Castoriadis’ thought creation takes place through the alteration of 
time and space, and the multiplicity that this entails in the social-historical domain is the 
ontological situation of the anthropic regions of being; as such, the essence of the chora is 
revealed, in some sense, as the open question of overarching time. 
This relation is evoked in the excess of the limits of subjectivity within the social-
historical domain. The chora, when thought with the altering flux of physis, is indissociable 
from the possible otherness accumulated in residual excess. In fact, Castoriadis’ notion 
of the social-historical thrives on residual excess, whereby society, as instituted through a 
self-altering flux, that is continuous with the world of discrete objects, necessarily involves 
the historical past. This is, in many ways, already developed within Castoriadis’ notion 
of the radical imaginary, which is the instituting social imaginary of the social-historical region 
of being. The radical imaginary is involved in the creation of “institutions and, of course, 
first and foremost, of language”25, operative at the level of social imaginary significations, 
and in turn, their institution. The trans-regionality, inherent in the notion of chora, is 
evident in that the instituting social imaginary gives form to the world of the sensible and the 
intelligble, and does so through instituting society as a totality attempting to account for 
     22. Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, Castoriadis Reader, 327.
     23. Castoriadis, Ibid, 326.
     24. Adams, Castoriadis’s Ontology: Being and Creation, 211.
     25. Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, Castoriadis Reader, 329.
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other regions of being, through which, in not being able to truly achieve this, the process 
doubles over itself in the act of its own definition. This is due to unavoidable excess of 
society as an imaginary institution ‘leaning on’ other regions of being, which is a ‘leaning 
on’ what is outside and unknown. It is in this regard that residual excess is not in rigid 
opposition to intelligible objects or categories; rather the world of flux is continuous 
with the world of discrete objects, in dialogue and in movement with them—this is 
important in terms of time and the social-historical, in saying that with each present 
moment the whole past is carried with it. To paraphrase Bergson; ‘every moment of the 
present brings with it the past’26. This idea is radicalised in Castoriadis’ conception of 
social-historical creation, by virtue of creation being ex-nihilo. A creation that is new, that 
creates new axioms and therefore can’t be grounded, in this sense, as Castoriadis has 
elaborated, “a creation is neither deducible nor producible: that’s the true meaning of 
the new. If it is deducible and producible, it isn’t new; it exists potentially within the prior 
system”27. The inherited tradition of western thought, even through Bergson, occluded 
this radical dimension of the imagination, creation ex-nihilo “was covered up by the idea 
of ‘degrees of being’—of ‘intensity of existence’—linked very rapidly with the criteria 
of duration”28, marking ‘true being’ with determinate characteristics, “so that everything 
belonging to the Heraclitean flux became disqualified”29. The markings of identitary 
time, through creation ex-nihilo, can be seen vividly from the point of view, that “the 
time that is instituted as identitary is time as the time of mark-makings, as time-marking 
and the time of markings”30. This marking is also indissociable from imaginary time, 
which is the time of signification, or significant time, as the emergence of time as an 
instituted creation. 
The philosophy of Nishida Kitarô contains interesting parallels with Castoriadis. 
Nishida takes up the notion of continuity between intelligible and sensible forms in his 
conception of basho, which bears semblance to the notion of chora, particularly in the 
sense of its trans-regional nature. Nishida places a strong emphasis on this aspect in 
subsuming the subject/object distinction into the enveloping matrix of basho, placing 
the subjective characteristic of life within an absolutely contradictory self-identity. His trans-
regional architecture closely resembles that of Castoriadis, as David Dilworth has 
outlined, Nishida begins with “the physical world, which is to him the most abstract 
matrix of interacting forces. He builds up from this level to the biological, and finally 
to the human (historical-existential) worlds”31. Each of these ‘worlds’, ‘fields’, or ‘bashos’ 
reflect the separable and, yet, indissociable regions of being as considered by Castoriadis. 
Dilworth further explains that the modes of being of these ‘worlds’ presuppose and 
exhibit “the contradictory identity of objectivity and subjectivity, indicating the 
     26. See: Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics
     27. Varela, in, Castoriadis & Varela, “Interview: Cornelius Castoriadis & Francisco Varela”, Postscript on 
Insignificancy, 210-211.
     28. Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, Castoriadis Reader, 321.
     29. Castoriadis, Ibid, 321.
     30. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of  Society, 209.
     31. Dilworth, in, Nishida, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, 16.
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respective places of object logic and transcendental logic in a transpositional structure 
that progressively unfolds its own “concrete logic” and its most adequate exemplification 
in the historical-existential world”32. Here lies a striking resemblance to Castoriadis’ 
theory of ensemblistic-identitarian (ensidic) logic, which is the term given to account for 
the structure and constitution of social-imaginary significations. It is a logic that defines 
the social-historical region of being, by which the individual is socialised and through 
which the radical instituting imaginary is given. Nishida, too, had seen this transience of 
being, however, in order for the architectonics of these trans-regional ontologies to 
operate, both thinkers had to relate this architecture within a space whereby creation, 
even the various regions themselves, were to emerge from an ‘absolute’ or ‘overarching’ 
space, a chora. The truly choric space for Nishida is the enveloping muno basho, the place 
of nothingness, for Castoriadis this space is resolved via recourse to ‘the chaos, the abyss, 
the groundlessness’33, upon which we must create forms out of the chaos of the abyss 
and meaning from the groundless indeterminacy of being. There is also a parallel in 
Castoriadis’ conception of continuity, particularly concerning ‘contradictory identity’ 
within the self; both thinkers turn away from Hegelian synthesis, instead, Castoriadis 
draws from psychoanalytic resources. Melanie Klein’s influence concerning issues to 
do with conscious and unconscious regions of the psyche is significant in this respect. 
Indeed Castoriadis praises Klein’s work in that “the ambivalence of affects, incompatible 
properties of representations, the conflicts of desires are in fact posited as original and 
essential characteristics of the psyche”34. These characteristics are also fundamental 
for Kristeva’s understanding of a subject-in-process, through which the constant semiotic 
inconsistencies of the drive-laden unconscious are fed into sensible and intelligible 
symbolic representations. The semiotic chora gives movement to Kristeva’s subject in the 
same way that the radical imagination gives movement to Castoriadis’ subject. This is well 
reflected in Kristeva’s relation of body and space, reminiscent of Castoriadis’ rupture 
of the monadic core: “the drives that extract the body from its homogeneous shell and 
turn it into a space linked to the outside, they are the forces which mark out the chora 
in process”35. Interestingly, while Kristeva makes use of developing the notion of chora 
in theorising the creation of meaning36, the notion remains concealed in Castoriadis’ 
theorisation of this level within the broader architecture of trans-regional being.
The chora, therefore, involves the institution of a co-existent multiplicity of forms, 
which implies the continuity of permanently conflictual forms. In this sense, much is 
lost; unknowable, remaining outside, or fallen in-between, yet, much is also created, 
interpreted and returned. Central to Kristeva’s understanding of this characteristic of the 
chora is the notion of anamnesis, as a revitalising kind of remembrance. This presupposes 
a forgetting that Kristeva unearths in a double sense; as Margaroni presents it, this 
     32. Dilworth, Ibid, 16.
     33. Castoriadis, ‘The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy’, Castoriadis Reader.
     34. Castoriadis, Ibid, 281.
     35. Kristeva, “The Subject in Process”, The Tel Quel Reader, 143.
     36. Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language.
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is a “forgetting of its primal scene and the forgetting of this forgetting”37. To give an 
example, the so-called ‘return to the Greeks’ in philosophical discourse, can be seen as 
such a process of anamnesis that proposes to offer new gathering points for philosophy. 
In a manner that relates to the chora, as represented by Plato in the Timaeus, “the very 
concept of the beginning loses itself in its own proliferating doubles”38, in a consistent 
renewal based on the anamnesis of what is salvaged from the forgotten, unknown excess, 
made latent in forgetting. For Kristeva this is the basis for permanent conflictuality, 
whereby the residual excess cannot be excluded from the movement of time. Castoriadis 
frames this through a problematic of knowing/not-knowing, which is tied up with the 
immortality of the soul, in a way that he begs is not “archaic, folkloric, bizarre, wild, 
primitive, backward or weird”—‘out there’ perhaps, but in itself an example of my 
previous example:
Souls know because they have seen the Ideas elsewhere, in a supracelestial place;  
and in becoming embodied, they are weighed down and they forget this knowledge,  
which nevertheless remains; it still resides within them39 
One way to make sense of this is to refer back to the umwelt/eigenwelt relation, in which 
the horizon of the eigenwelt is marked with the traces of the umwelt. The process of 
anamnesis is a way by which the chora is innate to being. In this respect, the chora, as the 
space for meaning, as the principle of self-ordering, reflects a generative capacity to 
form meaning from the chaos of permanent conflictuality. It is worth noting that in a 
published conversation between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek40, referring to Kant’s 
transcendental subject, Žižek talks of the access of this subject to the inhuman as a space 
of redefinition. In similar respects, this is the situation of permanent conflictuality, as a 
situation of continuity. The condition of residual excess presents the space whereby the 
subject is faced with a situation of permanent conflictuality—which is an aspect of the 
space of the chora. It is in this sense that the chora becomes a space for reinterpretation 
or redefinition. 
CHORA AND THE MOVEMENT OF AUTO-POIESIS 
Castoriadis also addresses this issue from another angle, in his engagement with 
Francisco Varela, concerning the biological conception of self-organisation, of biological 
autonomy as auto-poiesis. As Varela considers, with regard to this relationship:
This rootedness of meaning in the origin of life is the novel aspect of this concept 
of autonomy, of auto-poiesis… that there is an excess of the imaginary that comes 
from this self-construction of the living being—is one of the things I learned while 
reading Corneille [Castoriadis]. And I would never have dared to speak of the 
imaginary as being at life’s origin had I not had at my disposal this sort of continuity 
     37. Margaroni, ‘The Lost Foundation: Kristeva’s Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy’, Hypatia, 83.
     38. Margaroni, Ibid, 83.
     39. Castoriadis, On Plato’s Statesman, 64.
     40. Žižek, in, Badiou & Žižek, Philosophy in the Present: Badiou & Žižek, 73-100.
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between the biological phenomena at life’s origin and the social domain41
Castoriadis elaborates his version of auto-poeisis, proposing that “the proper characteristic 
of creation is to make possibilities arise that didn’t exist beforehand. The first living 
cell that emerged created, in a sense, the possibilities of life, which previously existed 
only in a completely empty and sophistic fashion”42, framing his conception within a 
broader notion of living being, as a region of being reflecting self-organisation outside 
of the realm of meaning. This pre-supposes a trans-regional continuity between the 
physical and biological levels. Such a notion of auto-poeisis—as a concept relating to life 
and the living being—relies on the porosity of being, whereby the elements pertaining 
to creation originate from, both, inside and outside of the body—alluding to the 
possibilities of creation that emerge from the state of permanent conflictuality. Auto-poiesis 
is inextricably entwined with a notion of choric movement in the sense that it moves 
naturally through all levels of being. Castoriadis analyses movement as existing through 
an auto-poietic flux of alloiõsis. This Aristotelian notion presents physis as that “which has 
in itself the principle (the origin) of its movement”43. By envisaging living being within 
the flux of choric movement highlights the crossroads between the cosmic and social 
regions of being. Castoriadis’ radicalisation of Aristotelian physis is formulated as an 
eidetic eros, with a disposition toward ensidic ordering of meaning. Through the schema 
of ensidic logic, and the magma of  significations constituting the world44, the temporality 
of being is then conceived as a movement that is “pushing-toward-giving-itself-a-form”45. 
Castoriadis, here, makes an important distinction between teleology and teleonomy, which 
radicalises the biological concept of teleonomy, concerning adaptation, toward a broader 
cosmic definition of being as à-être, as auto-poietic. 
By elucidating physis as the movement of life Castoriadis claims that our existence as 
autonomous living beings instigates a process of trans-regional coherence, constituting 
a bridge of meaning over the abyss. Language, reflected as the appearance of legein 
and teukhein, is the structure of this bridge. Language mediates between self and world, 
the eigenwelt and the umwelt. Kristeva highlights this, in a semiological sense, noting on 
her philosophical project, that she is “interested in language and in the other side of 
language which is filtered inevitably by language and yet is not language”46. Language, 
in this sense, is the visible constellation of meaning that is open to the reversibility of 
meaning. The chora, then, is precisely that cosmic metaphor for meaning that is also non-
meaning and being as an ordering of dis-order. Here we see language rationalised from 
both sides of the bridge as the subject fuses a multifaceted interpretation of meaning. 
     41. Varela, in, Castoriadis & Varela, “Interview: Cornelius Castoriadis & Francisco Varela”, Postscript on 
Insignificancy, 204.
     42. Castoriadis, in, Ibid, 211.
     43. Castoriadis, ‘Phusis and Autonomy’, World in Fragments, 334.
     44. Castoriadis, ‘The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy’, Castoriadis Reader.
     45. Castoriadis, ‘Phusis and Autonomy’, World in Fragments, 333.
     46. Kristeva, in, Kristeva & Pollock, ‘Dialogue with Julia Kristeva’, Parallax, 9. Interestingly, both Kristeva 
and Castoriadis hold the same critique of Lacan, in that he represses that indeterminate ‘other side’ of 
language.
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One side involves an encounter with knowledge that is encoded within the residual 
ensidic logic of social-historical meaning. The other is experienced through a primordial 
state of meaning as the emergence of  radical imagination, from the region of living being, 
through the psyche. This requires an interpretation of meaning in accordance with auto-
poietic drives, which, as Castoriadis argues, is the work of the radical imaginary. In this 
way, the interpretation of meaning resonates through the subject in an orientation that 
is, both, ‘for-itself ’ and ‘for-the-world’. This is why interpretation and creation are one in the 
same activity of alteration—resonating with Kristeva’s notion of the subject-in-process—
and opening the embodied subject to the social world through the meaning-making 
process, which implies a cross-fertilisation of social imaginary significations and psychic 
drives. It is the space of this cross fertilisation that Castoriadis talks of le social, translated 
into English as the ‘social sphere’, which is a notion closely resembling a choric space. 
He refers to le social as, both, “space and process of creation”47. Alluding to the choric 
dimension of the social-historical, as an elaboration of this space and process: 
There would be no true history if there were no change, no rupture and creation.  
The social-historical is essentially emergence of new social imaginary significations,  
new meanings. Its institution, the dynamic between the instituting—the radical  
imagination—and the instituted—the already created institutions—is secondary  
with regard to this basic characteristic of human collectives that is the capacity to  
create new significations.48
Castoriadis places emphasis on the always-becoming aspect of subjectivity between living 
being and the social-historical realm. The self/world relation is therefore a creative 
relation, conceivable as the movement of time through the chora, as the emergence of 
otherness. The proliferation of difference is not time, for Castoriadis difference refers to space, 
that is, a space of coexistence, a space of permanent conflictuality; which is the site of  
radical imagination. This distinction is crucial for Castoriadis’ unbounding of temporality 
from the reduction of time to space—as the inherited tradition of western philosophy 
would have it. For difference possesses multiple times. Time, in itself, is conceivable as 
the musicality of alloiõsis, of alteration, marked through the emergence of otherness and 
coexistent with different times.
Castoriadis has made clear many times, “no being-for-itself could ‘organize’ 
something out of the world, if this world were not intrinsically organisable”49, implying 
that the cosmos is not simply chaotic, that there is something resembling a chora, by 
which form and meaning is able to be created and ordered. In questioning our natural 
disposition toward eidetic form, we turn to schemas of chaos and cosmos, order and 
disorder, nomos and physis—this, in every sense, is the activity that the metaphor of the 
chora intends to capture. In making this distinction Castoriadis develops the previously 
teleological tendency of the inherited tradition, from a transcendental being or 
teleological history, toward a more nuanced appropriation of a movement whereby time 
     47. Castoriadis, ‘Psyche and Society Revisited’, Figures of  the Thinkable (Including Passion and Knowledge), 371.
     48. Castoriadis, Ibid, 371-372.
     49. Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, Castoriadis Reader, 326.
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is defined through self-creation. Leading to an understanding of being, and autonomy, 
that pushes the limits of knowledge. This involves envisaging the role of the chora, not 
only, through the alterations of physis, but in the self-altering openness of nomos. In this 
sense, “everything that is must contain an ensemblistic-identitary (‘logical’, in the largest 
sense possible) dimension; otherwise it would be absolutely indeterminate, and (at least 
for us) non-existent”50. This encompassing ‘logical’ dimension is precisely the space of 
the chora for Castoriadis, becoming even more evident even more so when he goes 
on to say, that “this, of course, by no means entails that ‘what there is’ is exhaustively 
determined by or reducible to ‘logic’ (not even when we consider ‘physical’ reality)”51. 
This is why the self-altering character of nomos can be seen as a quintessential character 
of anthrõpos, as it is through this self-alteration that we create meaning over the abyss; 
as Castoraidis remarks, “the ultimately indescribable X ‘out there’ becomes something 
definite and specific for a particular being, through the functioning of its sensory and 
logical imagination, which ‘filters’, ‘forms’, and ‘organizes’ the external ‘shocks’”52. This 
indescribable X is the modus of creation, existing on the outside and in-between the 
trans-regional architecture of our being. Castoriadis’ thought is a window to this abyss. 
It has exposed us to the indeterminate nature of the chora and in so doing has passed 
on the responsibility to act autonomously in the space within which we dwell, which is 
becoming increasingly important in the face of the rising tide of insignificancy noticeably 
deteriorating the institutions of western society.
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